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A B S T R A C T
A better use of land and water resources will be necessary to meet the increasing demand for food in the
Nile basin. Using a hydro-economic model along the storyline of three future political cooperation
scenarios, we show that the future of food production in the Basin lies not in the expansion of intensively
irrigated areas and the disputed reallocation of water, but in utilizing the vast forgotten potential of
rainfed agriculture in the upstream interior, with supplemental irrigation where needed. Our results
indicate that rainfed agriculture can cover more than 75% of the needed increase in food production by
the year 2025. Many of the most suitable regions for rainfed agriculture in the Nile basin, however, have
been destabilized by recent war and civil unrest. Stabilizing those regions and strengthening intra-basin
cooperation via food trade seem to be better strategies than unilateral expansion of upstream irrigation,
as the latter will reduce hydropower generation and relocate, rather than increase, food production.
ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Major socioeconomic and geopolitical transformations are
affecting the allocation of one of the world’s most disputed
resources: the water of the Nile River. At present, most water in the
Lower Nile is being utilized, mainly for irrigation by downstream
Egypt. Attempts to convert existing water allocation, primarily
based on the 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan, to a more
equitable share for all countries have not been successful (Nicol
and Cascão, 2011). The regional balance of power is, however,
changing: (i) the political upheaval after the Arab spring has
weakened the dominance of Egypt (Nicol and Cascão, 2011); (ii) in
an increasingly multi-polar world, access to infrastructure loans to
build dams and irrigation infrastructure upstream has diversiﬁed
(Broadman, 2008; Foster et al., 2009); and (iii) foreign investors
have taken a renewed interest in the basin’s agricultural resources,
buying and leasing agricultural land all over the basin (Cotula et al.,
2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Amid these* Corresponding author at: Alterra, Wageningen University and Research Centre
(WUR), PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands.
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1462-9011/ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.transformations, reallocation of Nile water is a hot issue (Cascão,
2009; Waterbury, 2002; Whittington et al., 2005), with many
countries seeking to utilize more water for hydropower and food
production.
Increased food availability in the basin is urgent. According to
the 2012 report of the United Nations, “The State of Food Insecurity
in the World” (FAO et al., 2012), 100 million people in the countries
of the basin are undernourished, which amounts to almost a third
of the local population. Undernourishment has increased in
northern and sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, bucking
the world-wide trend. Except for Egypt, none of the 11 Basin
countries are self-sufﬁcient in food (Omiti et al., 2011). Within the
context of high and volatile commodity prices that favour net
producers over buyers (Breisinger et al., 2010; Swinnen and
Squicciarini, 2012), this reliance on global markets is a dangerous
gamble: recent political instability in the Nile region has been
directly linked to food price hikes (Arezki and Bruckner, 2011), and
these risks will only increase. The population of the Basin countries
is expected to grow by a third, from 367 million in 2012 to
488 million in 2025 (UNDP, 2011). At the same time, world-wide
competition for land, water, energy, and, ultimately, food is
increasing (Godfray et al., 2010). Developing countries like those in
the Nile, with purchasing powers much lower than that of other
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shortages (Rutten et al., 2013).
We aim to support the complex policy challenge of the Nile
basin by clarifying the science behind the discourse on water,
energy and food security, exploring the possibility of national to
regional food self-sufﬁciency as alternatives to an increasing
reliance on global markets. We approach this from a hydro-
economic perspective and argue that with the water resources of
the Nile itself almost fully and productively allocated, the real
solution to future food self-sufﬁciency for the Basin lies outside the
domain of water allocation and irrigated agriculture and in the
rainfed areas of South Sudan and the Lake Victoria region.
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), the potential area suitable for cultivation in South Sudan
alone is as high as 30 million hectares, which is ten times the
cropped area of Egypt. Only about 10% of that potential is currently
being used for agriculture. Recent world-wide assessments of food
production have stressed intensiﬁcation in existing areas, rather
than expansion to new areas, as the best way of increasing food
production (Foley et al., 2011; Godfray et al., 2010; Tilman et al.,
2011). The Nile basin seems to be an important exception, with a
combination of both intensiﬁcation and expansion being war-
ranted.
2. Methods
2.1. Approach
For our research, we derived a baseline of water use (Fig. 2),
agricultural crop production and gross margin (GM) in the Nile
basin around the year 2005, using an area-based hydro-economic
model in simulation mode (WaterWise (Siderius et al., 2016); see
Section 2.2 and SI1). For this, a present–day spatial distribution of
land use systems (FAO, 2009) was made consistent with country-
speciﬁc FAO crop statistics (FAO, 2004) on actual cropped area
(SI2). Crop production and agricultural gross margin (GM) of the
water-limited production was then calculated for both rainfed and
irrigated crops.
Next, we estimated food requirements in the basin for the year
2025. Future food self-sufﬁciency correction factors per country
were based on the projected population increase up to 2025
(UNDP, 2011) and a population-average calorie requirement of
2300 kcal/person per day (Tontisirin and de Haen, 2001). As such, a
minimum intake was imposed, without regard for household
access, dietary preferences, or nutritional value. We assumed that
agricultural production in the Nile catchment part of each country
will grow at the same pace as each country’s average and that the
proportion of food crops to cash crops remains the same. Future
food self-sufﬁciency targets for the Nile basin could then be
derived by multiplying baseline agricultural production with these
correction factors (Table 2).
Finally, we applied the hydro-economic model in optimization
mode, to select those investments in agriculture (area-wise
expansion or intensiﬁcation of rainfed agriculture and new
irrigation schemes) and hydropower (new reservoirs) that gener-
ate the highest GM using the available land and water resources.
We explored where and how food production can best be increased
and whether food self-sufﬁciency for the basin and its individual
countries can be achieved by the year 2025.
2.2. WaterWise model
Our model resembles existing hydro-economic models devel-
oped for the Nile (Block and Strzepek, 2010; Block et al., 2007;
Jeuland, 2010; Whittington et al., 2005; Wu and Whittington,2006). Similarly to the model of Whittington et al. (2005) it
describes the whole Nile basin, including all existing irrigation
schemes and hydropower reservoirs, and most of the proposed
hydropower plans. Water gets transmitted through the river
network using a routing scheme in combination with the variable
storage method for the dynamics of large water bodies (swamps,
reservoirs), with use in one location limiting options elsewhere.
Economic parameters, like the pricing of hydropower, are like
those in earlier optimization studies. However, in contrast to the
latter we did not limit our analysis to the river system alone, i.e.
optimizing hydropower and irrigation yields, but included yield
from rainfed land use. Land use is an endogenous variable in our
model and land-use changes and the impact on downstream ﬂows
are thereby integrated into the optimization. The general idea
behind the model is that it should be capable of exploring a wide
range of land and water management options, for various scenarios
with respect to basin cooperation. Such an exploratory function-
ality necessitates a relatively simple model formulation for both
hydrology and agronomy. It should then be realized that the model
results are just indicative of a search direction. Further studies are
needed for more accurate assessments.
The model optimizes GM by choosing the optimal combination
of land and water use options for each of 1371 so-called
hydrotopes, units of similar soil and meteorological characteristics,
given available water resources:
YTOT ¼ YLU þ YHP  CLWM
with
YLU ¼ Sz;u;y Prodz;u;y  Py;u  CLUu  Acz;u;y
 
CLWM ¼ Sz;u;y CIRRIz;u  Acz;u;y
 
where YTOT represents total gross margin (in USD/yr), YLU the proﬁt
from land use (USD/yr) based on production (Prod, in ton) times
price of product (P, USD/ton) minus non-water costs (CLU, USD/ha)
times the cropped area (Ac, in ha), in year y per land use u in
hydrotope z. YHP is the GM of hydropower (USD/yr). CLWM are the
costs of local water-management measures for supporting land
use, i.e., the variable costs of local irrigation measures (in USD/ha),
depending on the amount of water used. Variable costs of water
relate to pumping costs, which is a combination of labor, capital
and energy costs. For the variable costs of water we used a regional
estimate of 0.01 USD/m3 (Hellegers and Perry, 2006).
Crop production and related water ﬂuxes for all land and water
use options in each hydrotope are pre-processed by water-crop
modules run in an ofﬂine mode (SI2). In the Nile application a soil
moisture accounting model of the bucket type is used, very similar
to the AQUACROP model of the FAO (Raes et al., 2011), but more
advanced in simulating soil storage and drainage, while simplify-
ing the dynamic crop growth. Rainfall can contribute to runoff,
drainage, or groundwater storage, after correcting for evapotrans-
piration. The calculation scheme for the evapotranspiration
follows the FAO single crop coefﬁcient method (Allen et al.,
1998), applied separately to the vegetated and non-vegetated part.
Crop production is simulated with a slightly modiﬁed form of the
Ky approach of FAO (Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979), where the ratio
between actual and potential evapotranspiration is translated into
a mean yield ratio. Actual yield in each hydrotope is then calculated
by multiplying this mean yield ratio with a predeﬁned potential
yield. This relatively simple method has the advantage of being
robust and requiring a minimum of data.
WaterWise optimizes GM of food production by i. converting
non-arable land into arable land, by ii. converting existing arable
land into high-intensive variants and/or iii. by increasing the area
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Fig. 1. WW-Nile arable land vs FAOSTAT arable land estimates (with irrigated area
from AQUASTAT). ‘Sudan’ includes both Sudan and South Sudan, but excludes
irrigated area in Sudan.
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irrigation areas, depending on irrigation water availability and
availability of investments. GM from hydropower can be increased
by routing more water through existing hydropower schemes, if
turbine capacity allows, or by investing in new ones.
Investment costs for the conversion to irrigated area were based
on a comprehensive study on the cost of irrigation by IFPRI
(Inocencio et al., 2007). We took the value for ‘success’ projects,
under the optimistic assumption that new irrigation systems will
be designed, constructed and maintained according to the latest
knowledge and standards. There is a clear difference between
north Africa and sub-Saharan Africa: the latter having, at
3552 USD/ha, only about half the conversion costs as North Africa.
Conversion to arable land was made possible at an investment of
2174 USD/ha, assuming that conversion to rainfed arable land is
similar to land preparation for irrigation, but without the
additional hardware costs. Investments costs in new hydropower
were mainly based on grey literature (see SI2). All major planned
hydropower plants, including Ethiopia’s highly controversial
Grand Renaissance Dam, were offered as options.
The optimization was performed on the basis of two
representative climate years—a relatively wet year (1999) followed
by a dry year (2000). We did not explicitly include water demand
from other sectors like household and industry, being relatively
small compared to agricultural demand, nor the economic beneﬁts
of ﬂood or sediment control, or environmental ﬂows. Climate
change was left out from the analysis. Within the time-frame
considered, we expect that any climate change trend will be
overshadowed by existing natural variability. However, rainfall
projections for East Africa do show a large spread between climate
models for the periods beyond 2025, adding considerable
uncertainty to any long-term investment decision.
2.3. Data and schematization
Rainfall from the tropical rainfall measurement mission
(TRMM) (Kummerow et al., 1998) and daily reference evapotrans-
piration from ECMWF (Uppala et al., 2005) were used as
meteorological inputs, with soil properties coming from FAO-
UNESCO’s 1974 Soil Map of the World(1:5,000,000), soil classes
aggregated based on maximum soil moisture storage and surface
slope. A present-day spatial distribution of land use systems (FAO,
2009) at 5 arc minutes spatial resolution was made consistent with
country-speciﬁc Food and Agriculture Organization crop statistics
(FAOSTAT) (FAO, 2004) on actual cropped area by correcting for
fallow area. Estimations of arable land were only available at
national level. Simply correcting based on land area would lead to
an underestimation of arable land within the Nile basin, the Basin
part being wetter, in general. A Nile basin estimate was derived by
multiplying the national average with the relative proportion of
humid zone within the Basin area, as proposed by the FAO
(Appelgren et al., 2000). A more detailed mapping of the irrigated
areas was achieved by a supervised classiﬁcation of Landsat images
in combination with a FAO map indicating regions with a certain
percentage of irrigation (Occurrence of irrigated areas (FGGD);
(FAO, 2007; Siebert et al., 2005)). Training sites (areas in the map
that are known to be representative) for the irrigated area class
were determined based on prior knowledge of the location of some
of the major irrigated areas in Egypt and Sudan. The irrigated area
was then based on the classiﬁcation of the high-resolution (30m)
Landsat images, but only in regions where irrigation has been
reported according to the lower-resolution (10 m) FAO irrigated
area map. The major irrigated areas in the Nile delta, in the Nile
valley and in Sudan could be well identiﬁed, with their area
matching the area as reported in FAOSTAT (Fig. 1).For arable land in each country we deﬁned a unique country-
speciﬁc cropping system, CCSs, representing a range of crops. Only
crops that occupy each at least 10% of the arable area in at least ﬁve
countries according to FAOSTAT (FAO, 2004) were included. This
resulted in seven main crops: bananas, beans, maize, sorghum,
sweet potatoes, vegetables and wheat. Because of the importance
of groundnuts for Sudanese agriculture and rice for Egyptian
agriculture these two crops were added. For each country, ﬁve
dominant crops were selected from this subset and based on these
ﬁve crops an average price per ton produced and cost per ha were
derived for each country-speciﬁc cropping system. This resulted in
a total of seven rainfed and two irrigated CCSs for the basin as a
whole (Table 1). Crop growth periods and monthly crop factors, to
multiply the daily reference evaporation with, were derived from
Allen et al. (1998). Except for the sorghum cropping pattern in
Sudan we assumed a double crop rotation in each country.
A uniform region-speciﬁc potential yield of 4 ton/ha was
derived by correlating country-speciﬁc crop yields on rainfed
arable land (in ton/ha, from FAOSTAT, 2004) with the ETa/ETp ratio
of each country (AQUASTAT) (R2 = 0.7). While this is a gross
simpliﬁcation of the diversity in crop production, a potential yield
of 4 ton/ha does correspond well with earlier estimates (e.g.
Penning de Vries et al., 1997). By using a region-speciﬁc potential
yield, limiting factors other than water, for example, phosphate
shortages, pests, or Nile region-speciﬁc restrictions in the agro-
food chain infrastructure, are implicitly taken into account.
Economic parameters in terms of crop prices and costs per hectare
do differ per country. Average costs and prices for each CCS were
calculated using area averaging of the FAOSTAT data, thereby
ignoring any price ﬂuctuations or uncertainty.
Large scale irrigation was separately schematized and parame-
terized. This type of irrigation in the Nile Basin is currently
concentrated in Egypt and Sudan. Especially in Sudan and Ethiopia
there is the land potential to increase the area irrigated (Block and
Strzepek, 2010; Block et al., 2007). Irrigation from the main water
courses was only allowed in predeﬁned large-scale irrigation
schemes, currently located in Egypt and Sudan. Yield, price and
cost data per hectare for Egypt could be derived directly from
FAOSTAT data (FAO, 2004), but for Sudan these were available only
as an average of irrigated and rainfed areas combined. Sudan’s
irrigated agriculture is known to underperform because of the
siltation of irrigation canals, waterlogging, and general deteriora-
tion of operation and maintenance (Plusquellec, 1990). Sudan’s
Fig. 2. Comparison of WaterWise-Nile runoff contribution and abstraction with modelled runoff (MWRI, 2005) and runoff derived from water balance estimates (Sutcliffe
and Parks, 1999) for the main water balance areas of the Nile (in billion m3/yr). The water demand of the Delta and Valley was not available for the latter two studies and
therefore omitted. No ﬁgures for the White Nile are available from Sutcliffe & Parks because of the different catchment schematization. WaterWise-Nile was validated on the
wet, average, and dry years of 1999–2001; Sutcliffe and Parks have determined the runoff based on measurement data of the period 1905–1995. The period of the MWRI study
represents 1991–2001. Water abstractions of 70 billion M3 to Egypt support unofﬁcial estimates, suggesting that actual releases at Aswan are higher for the period evaluated
than the, often reported, ofﬁcially allocated 55.5 billion M3 (Nicol and Cascão, 2011) even after correction for return ﬂows.
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same costs, and cropping intensity at only half of its potential. With
regard to new irrigation schemes in Sudan and Ethiopia, we
assume that investors, water managers and irrigation engineers
have learned from past mistakes and that productivity will match
that of irrigated agriculture in Egypt.2.4. Scenarios
We evaluated the target of food self-sufﬁciency under three
transformative scenarios with varying degrees of cooperation,
which are currently under debate. A hydro-economic model like
WaterWise searches, if unrestricted, for a basin-wide optimum,
thus reﬂecting complete cooperation and sharing of GM. This
Table 1
Cropping system characteristics for the dominant crops as derived from FAOSTAT (current) and estimates for future.
Current Yield Potential yield Price Cost Potential GM Dominant crops in the Double cropping
ton/ha ton/ha US$/ton US$/ha US$/ha cropping system
Current
Burundi 3.6 4.0 216 122 736 Beans–Bananas Yes
Egypt (irrigated) 19.5 19.5 122 183 2197 Wheat–maize Yes
Ethiopia 1.5 4.0 149 92 499 Sorghum–wheat Yes
Kenya 2.4 4.0 125 106 390 Beans–maize Yes
Rwanda 3.9 4.0 218 136 730 Beans–bananas Yes
Sudan 0.6 4.0 152 92 510 Sorghum No
Sudan (irrigated) 9.7 9.7 122 183 1007 Sorghum–wheat Yes
Tanzania 1.7 4.0 147 96 486 Maize–s. potatoes Yes
Uganda 2.9 4.0 218 123 743 Beans–Bananas Yes
Future
Future intensive 4.0 218 123 743 Not speciﬁed Yes
Ethiopia (newly irrigated) 19.5 122 123 2256 ,, Yes
Sudan (newly irrigated) 19.5 122 183 2196 ,, Yes
18 C. Siderius et al. / Environmental Science & Policy 61 (2016) 14–23cooperation can then be restricted by speciﬁc boundary conditions
or objective targets. With the model we focus on the allocation of
land and water resources. The third production factor, labour, is
assumed to be available and was not taken into account.
The background of the “National Food Self-Sufﬁciency” scenario
is a future where cooperation and trade of agricultural produce is
limited and food self-sufﬁciency is a target of each country
individually; GM will drop once supply exceeds demand since
transaction costs will increase once products have to be trans-
ported to other markets. To mimic this behaviour to the extreme in
the model, the weight of land use revenues above a country’s target
is reduced to nil in the objective function. In the “Upstream
Hegemony” scenario, Ethiopia and Sudan maximize their agricul-
tural GM for international export, irrespective of any downstream
demands. All new irrigation schemes and the rehabilitation of
existing irrigation schemes in Ethiopia and Sudan are forcefully
implemented in the model at the investment cost required. In
addition, the model maximizes agricultural GM of the major
irrigation schemes in these two countries via the objective
function. The “Basin Cooperation” scenario represents a future
of enhanced trade in agricultural commodities within the basin,
underpinned by infrastructural developments and political,
economic, and ﬁnancial cooperation. In the model this is
implemented by solving the objective function for the basin as a
whole, giving total freedom to maximize land use throughout the
basin to reach the food self-sufﬁciency target for the basin as a
whole. One country can offset shortages in another.Table 2
Food self-sufﬁciency and the contribution of irrigated agriculture to food self-sufﬁcienc
baseline (2005) and three future scenarios.
Baseline Future Target
2025
Scenarios
National Food Self-
Sufﬁciency
Country Contribution of
irrigation to food
self-sufﬁciency
Overall
food self-
sufﬁciency
Needed
increase in
agriculture
GM
Contribution of
irrigation to food
self-sufﬁciency
O
f
s
Egypt 100% 135% 17% 85% 8
Ethiopia 0% 78% 117% 16% 1
Sudan 28% 92% 83% 0% 1
Uganda 0% 102% 91% 0% 1
Other 0% 75% 165% 0% 6
Basin 48% 111% 74% 27% 9
Sudan includes both Sudan and South Sudan, but changes in the contribution of rainfe
restricted to Sudan, which contains all the large-scale irrigated areas.Our model includes both expansion of agricultural area and
intensiﬁcation with higher proﬁts and costs per hectare, with
investments in agriculture competing with investments in
hydropower. The difference between expansion and intensiﬁcation
in the model needs to be interpreted with care. Especially small-
scale agriculture is likely to be clustered with non-agricultural land
uses in the present day land use classiﬁcation. In addition, in war-
torn regions, many ﬁelds have been temporarily abandoned or left
fallow. In these areas, ‘expansion’ will refer more to a leap in
production from low-yield agriculture to a form of commercial
agriculture connected to regional markets, rather than an
agricultural development from scratch.
Livestock was not explicitly included in our analysis, as we
focused on arable farming, which has a far larger claim on land and
water resources. We assumed livestock raising to be integrated
with arable farming in mixed agricultural systems, without explicit
additional land and water demands. An exception to this in the Nile
Basin could be the large grazing areas in Sudan and South Sudan.
Conversion of these existing pastoral lands to arable lands was not
restricted in the model. However, in general, the model did not
select these areas for arable expansion. The mere existence of
pastoral lands can, in itself, be an indication that biophysical
circumstances make such lands less suitable for arable farming for
example, because of erratic or strong seasonality in rainfall.
We focused on the near future, in which we assume gradual
autonomous technological progress in rainfed farming practices in
those countries currently producing at a GM level below they targets for the main food-producing countries in the Nile basin (Nile basin area);
Upstream
Hegemony
Basin Cooperation
verall
ood self-
ufﬁciency
Contribution of
irrigation to food
self-sufﬁciency
Overall
food self-
sufﬁciency
Contribution of
irrigation to food
self-sufﬁciency
Overall food
self-
sufﬁciency
5% 57% 57% 78% 78%
00% 16% 80% 16% 80%
00% 122% 237% 93% 223%
00% 0% 111% 0% 111%
6% 0% 96% 0% 98%
2% 36% 103% 38% 107%
d production to GM refer mainly to South Sudan, while changes in irrigation are
Fig. 3. Increase in annual agricultural gross margin (in USD/ha) between baseline (2005) and 2025 (in a scenario of full “Basin Cooperation” on investments in land use change
and water resource allocation for agriculture and hydropower). The regions in dark green represent increase in gross margin in the rehabilitated irrigated areas of Sudan and
the new irrigated areas in Ethiopia, under the assumption that they reach the same productivity as Egypt’s irrigated areas. The drawn river width is proportional to annual
mean discharge in this scenario, with a maximum of 2622 m3/s after conﬂuence of the main Nile with the Atbara in Sudan. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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based growth, currently estimated at 1.3% for Sub-Saharan Africa
(Fuglie and Rada, 2013), was represented by an optional ‘future
intensive’ cropping system, activated under conditions of sufﬁcient
water availability (SI). No investments were required for con-
versions to more intense cropping systems, as they are assumed to
be an autonomous development within the boundaries of current
agronomic practices in the Basin.
3. Results
Comparison of WW-Nile runoff and abstraction with modelled
runoff (MWRI, 2005) and runoff derived from water balance
estimates (Sutcliffe and Parks, 1999) for the main water balance
areas of the Nile shows there is quite a good match between the
studies,especiallyconsideringthecomplexityof the hydrology inthe
basin (Fig. 2). Just like our study, these other studies are constrained
by data availability and conceptual limitations. Despite these
limitations, the runoff pattern is similar in the various subcatch-
ments—even the evaporative losses in the Sudd match rather well.
The largest differences can be found in subcatchments with
signiﬁcant irrigation water abstractions. The two other studies lack
data on irrigation abstractions, focussing primarily on natural ﬂow,
i.e. runoff, from the different subcatchments.
Our baseline value of annual agricultural GM of 15.4 billion USD
per year is about 35% lower than the single available FAO estimate for
the basin (Appelgren et al., 2000). The inclusion of livestock in the
latter ﬁgure, estimated at 18–35% of African agricultural GDP (Ehui
et al.,2002; Sansoucy,1995),canexplain a large partof the difference.
To accommodate the growth of the population and meet a minimum
food supply of 2300 kcal/p/day, total food requirements are expected
to rise by 75% over the 2005–2025 period, according to our
calculations. A major shift occurs in Egypt, which goes from food
surplus to shortage.
Our results show that under the “National Food Self-Sufﬁcien-
cy” scenario, when none of the countries is stimulated to have
surpluses due to lack of trade, investments shift towards
generating higher hydropower revenues and the basin as a whole
will fail to become food self-sufﬁcient (Table 2). Egypt, Rwanda,
and Eritrea are unable to produce enough food for their growing
populations because of the restricted availability of water or
agricultural lands. Under the “Upstream Hegemony” scenario,
when there is no restriction on trade within the basin, food self-
sufﬁciency can be realized in 2025 in the Nile basin at a total
investment cost of 100 billion USD. As imposed in the scenario,
Ethiopia and Sudan expand their irrigated agriculture. However,
this is achieved at the expense of increasing the vulnerability of
Egypt, with the ﬂow of water downstream being reduced by almost
40%, as Sudan and Ethiopia fully develop their irrigation potential.
Egypt will be able to produce only half its needed food require-
ments, increasing inequality in food self-sufﬁciency among
countries.
Under the “Basin Cooperation” scenario, the basin attains self-
sufﬁciency in a manner that is profoundly different from that of
“Upstream Hegemony”. Here, the Lake Victoria region and South
Sudan are responsible for the bulk of the increase in food production
through intensiﬁcation and expansion of the areas of rainfed
agriculture (Fig. 3), while allowing Egypt’s highly productive
irrigation schemes still to receive a large amount of water.
Interestingly, Ethiopia can be food self-sufﬁcient, but does not need
to be so under the ‘Basin Cooperation’ scenario, where climatic
circumstances for rainfed agriculture are more favourable in South
Sudanandinvestmentsthereareprioritized. A limitedreallocation of
irrigationwater toward Ethiopia is warranted though, as the country
has the comparative advantage of more favourable rainfall and
temperature conditions than Egypt or Sudan. Rehabilitating thecurrently underperforming schemes of Sudan is also prioritized, but
additional expansion further north near the Merowe Dam is not, as
irrigation there has no advantage over the existing schemes in Egypt.
Water allocations of 59 billion m3 to Egypt remain above its share of
55.5 billion m3 of the 1959 treaty, a number often quoted. The
construction of large hydropower reservoirs, like the Grand
Renaissance Dam, does not affect Egypt’s share, neither does
conversion of land to rainfed agriculture.
Rainfed agriculture contributes over 75% of the additional food
requirements in all scenarios. Expansion of rainfed agriculture is
suggested primarily in unstable regions of South Sudan and northern
Uganda, where the causes of underdevelopment are largely socio-
political as opposed to biophysical. Many parts of Africa are
characterized by high inter-annual and intra-annual variability in
rainfall (Cooper et al., 2008). A reliable rainfed agriculture will
require investments in local water harvesting and site-speciﬁc
supplemental irrigation (Rockström and Falkenmark, 2015), in the
long run supported by more accurate regional weather forecasting
and smart forms of crop, water and soil monitoring and manage-
ment. However, the pessimistic view of the whole of East African
agriculture being drought-stricken needs reﬁnement as well. Fig. 4,
which compares seasonal rainfall totals with crop water demand,
indicates suitability for rain-fed agriculture, with country regions
lying within the Nile basin being wetter than the countries’ total
averages. Potential new agricultural areas identiﬁed in this study
have a total crop season precipitation of about 900 mm, more than
double the country’s average and well above crop water require-
ments. Our model suggests investments in a total area of around
11 million ha in South Sudan, about a third of the potential identiﬁed.
If not all countries are self-sufﬁcient in food, as is the case under
the “Basin Cooperation” scenario, then regional trade is required to
deliver food to where it is needed. Food surplus regions in the basin
are situated in the south, whereas the largest shortages will occur
in the north: in Egypt and Eritrea. While basic transport
infrastructure is present in the form of river connections and
railroads, historic trade routes need to be revived. To make optimal
use of comparative advantages, staple food suitable for long-
distance transport to Egypt could be produced in upstream areas,
while Egypt could specialize in fresh produce for its urban
population and European markets (Wichelns et al., 2003). Export
of agricultural produce from South Sudan, which, according to our
calculations, could amount to 1.8 billion USD a year at farm-gate
level, will provide diversiﬁcation to this young economy, lessening
its dependence on oil. Ethiopia’s hydropower revenues could give
the country access to food markets, should it choose not to develop
its vulnerable highland regions to the maximum. The recent
integration of energy grids in the region shows that such
cooperation is possible.
4. Discussion
This study focusses on the potential to reach national to regional
food self-sufﬁciency in the Nile basin, as an alternative to an
increasing reliance on global markets. This focus on food self-
sufﬁciency gave us a framework to assess the contribution of rainfed
agriculture compared to that of irrigated agriculture and the impact
of different scenarios on the allocation of Nile waters. We do not,
however, wish to advocate basin cooperation and self-sufﬁciency as
the only solution or criticise a reliance on global markets. For this, a
different type of study including an analysis of the costs and beneﬁts
of regional to global food imports and exports would be required.
Similar to earlier studies that focused solely on irrigated
agriculture and hydropower (Whittington et al., 2005; Wu and
Whittington, 2006), we ﬁnd that basin cooperation will provide the
most beneﬁt to the basin—a result to be expected given the nature
Fig. 4. Satellite-derived country-speciﬁc rainfall (source: Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission [TRMM] data (Kummerow et al., 1998)) for various spatial delineations for
the main cropping seasons (JJASO for Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea; MAM and SON for all other countries) in relation to average crop water requirements of rainfed
agriculture during these months (set equal to potential crop evapotranspiration, based on average ECMWF reference evapotranspiration (Uppala et al., 2005) and FAO crop
factors, see SI). Green shades indicate a range between 75% and 100% of crop water requirements. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article.)
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objective function, however, greatly changes the solution space
available. Earlier (non-)cooperation studies with their strong focus
on Nile water allocation tend to emphasize potential conﬂicts
between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia and highlight the role of Egypt
as the main hegemon and the unequal distribution of water
(Cascão, 2008, 2009; Whittington et al., 2005; Wu and Whitting-
ton, 2006). In our study we show that a different distribution will
merely shift production, which will not be sufﬁcient to feed a
growing population. In rainfed agriculture areas, however, there
still is potential to increase production.
An integrated analysis of this kind faces numerous data
uncertainties. Several (the yield of hydropower, the yield of the
current irrigation system in Sudan and the investment cost of land
cover change) were assessed in a partial sensitivity analysis (SI5).Changes in these variables did not change the results such that the
main conclusions had to be revised. Inevitably, caveats remain. Our
study aims to explore different solutions from a hydro-economic
perspective, thereby simplifying the diversity of crop production.
Limitations, e.g. in terms of soil nutrient conditions, farmers’
knowledge levels and access to markets, were not explicitly
addressed, but implicitly included in a potential rainfed yield that
is lower than what would be expected from crop and soil and
meteorological characteristics alone.
For agriculture in the political and socio-economic unstable
regions of South Sudan and north Uganda to approach this
potential yield requires considerable effort in creating the
infrastructure to make knowledge, technology and inputs–seeds,
fertilizers and pesticides–available to farmers. This study did not
assess the likelihood of such developments, but rather advocates
22 C. Siderius et al. / Environmental Science & Policy 61 (2016) 14–23increased effort to make this happen. Environmental consequences
of such development should be thoroughly assessed. We did not
include environmental limitations to agricultural intensiﬁcation or
expansion. But a sustainable intensiﬁcation (Godfray et al., 2010),
with proper land management to reduce negative externalities of
increased production will be required in the Nile basin as much as
elsewhere.
Agricultural intensiﬁcation and expansion did not lead to
signiﬁcant changes in downstream runoff. We found that seasonal
evapotranspirative demand from arable lands was similar to that of
the original vegetation in most locations. Crop factors between
natural vegetation and arable crops do not differ much during the
peak growing season, when it rains most. Small variations in
evapotranspirative demand can be buffered by the soil column,
resulting in even smaller differences in runoff at the aggregated
time steps of a couple of days as is used in the model. In addition,
swamps in the main surface water system, located mainly in South
Sudan and evaporating a large fraction of runoff, further attenuate
any change in runoff from the white Nile part of the basin. It is in
this region where most land use changes were projected by the
model. In literature, increases in runoff after deforestation are
reported, but mainly for temperate regions. Results from the
tropics are mixed (Brown et al., 2005; Bruijnzeel, 1989). One of the
few extensive empirical studies from the Nile basin itself, by Hurni
et al. (2005),suggests that intensiﬁcation of land use on small test
plots has lead to increased surface runoff, but possibly also to
decreased baseﬂow, while soil conservation measures might have
led to less runoff in semi-arid regions, but not in the humid parts, in
the Ethiopian highlands. More in general, any change in land use on
less than 20% of the catchment area appears hard to detect in
runoff (Bosch and Hewlett, 1982; Brown et al., 2005; Stednick,
1996). Still, further study on the local and regional impact of
upstream land use changes and/without associated soil and water
conservation measures using a model with a more detailed
vegetation and land management parameterization would be
required to verify these initial ﬁndings.
In addition, a more detailed analysis of the impact of intra-
seasonal droughts on food production is needed to further verify
whether rainfed agriculture is sustainable. This should ideally be
supplemented with an analysis of the robustness of agriculture and
hydropower development under a range of future climate
scenarios, given the diversity in both magnitude and direction
of change in projections for this part of the world. Ultimately, a
comparison of regional versus global climate variability would
shed more light on whether the region would be better off
cooperating rather than depending on volatile global markets.
Although regional cooperation makes countries more vulnerable
to regional climate extremes, the region would still have a safety
net during such periods of basin-wide scarcity: the global market.
If the Nile region were to rely on the global market in the ﬁrst place,
it could no longer act as a safety net.
Finally, our study explored the possibility of different forms of
cooperation from a hydro-economic point of view, but did not
assess the likelihood of one form of cooperation versus the other or
the required political and institutional setting. One such institu-
tional option would be to reinvigorate and broaden the scope of the
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which aims to stimulate cooperation by
the nine Nile riparian countries. For the NBI to transit from a
project towards a River Basin Organisation, a Cooperative
Framework Agreement (CFA) has been outlined and a permanent
institutional mechanism should be established, the Nile River
Basin Commission (NRBC). In recent years, however, the NBI has
been struggling to deﬁne and agree on the CFA and to establish the
NRBC. Another option would be to embed negotiations on sharing
the Nile waters within East African trade blocks, like COMESA, the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. A focus onbroader economic cooperation, as also suggested by Wichelns et al.
(2003) and Hilhorst and Schütte (2010) and further explored and
quantiﬁed in this paper, can provide a new perspective on the issue
of sharing water resources by deﬁning common beneﬁts and a new
angle for cooperation within existing initiatives.
5. Conclusion
We argue that rainfed agriculture in unstable regions like South
Sudan and North Uganda is key to food self-sufﬁciency in the Nile
basin and that the heated debate on water allocation should be put
into perspective. Conﬂicts over allocation can only hinder
cooperation on food production and trade, thereby hampering
the Basin’s development.
Egypt’s policy stand in particular seems to resemble a risky
strategy: obstructing cooperation within the basin and hindering
upstream water infrastructure development, as it has done in the
past, gives Egypt the most water. But if this lack of cooperation
leads to unilateralism, increased and uncoordinated upstream
abstractions will have serious consequences for Egypt’s agriculture
and hydropower sectors. The resulting more unequal distribution
of food self-sufﬁciency among basin countries will jeopardize
regional stability. However, we also show that a more equitable
solution is available, should countries choose to cooperate on
basin-wide food production and trade, albeit with some, but rather
limited, loss of water allocations for Egypt. This will require old
policy dogmas to be relinquished and a change of perspective both
on the basin itself and on the utilization of its land and water
resources.
Such a change in perspective asks for a different, more
integrative approach to basin governance and investments, away
from the current focus on large water infrastructure projects.
Investments for supporting a transition towards a climate-smart
sustainable agriculture are needed, with technology improvement
and technology adaptation and transfer essential to reduce the
environmental impacts of increased production in the basin. The
alternative is an increased dependence of Nile basin countries on
volatile global food markets.
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